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AMULTI -COUNTRY STUDY OF THE INFORMATION IN THE TERM STRUCTURE
ABOUT FUTURE INFlATION
ABSTRACT
This paper provides evidence on what the term structure (for maturities of twelve months
or less) tells us about future inflation in ten OECD countries. The empirical results on the
information in the term structure contrast with those that find that the level of interest rates
help forecast the future level of inflation. Instead, they indicate that for the majority of the
countries in the sample, the term structure does not contain a great deal of information about the
future path of inflation. The results for France. the United Kingdom and Germany tell a
different story1 however. Inthesecountries the term structure contains a highly significant
amount of information about future changes in inflation.
The evidence in this paper suggests that central banks for most of the countries studied
here should exercise some caution in using the term structure of interest rates as a guide for
assessing inflationary pressures in the economy, as is currently under consideration by the U.S.
central bank. Although there is significant information in the term structure about the future
path of inflation for a few of the countries, this is not a result that is true in general.
The empirical evidence does reveal, however, that for every country studied except the
United Kingdom, there is a great deal of information in the term structure of nominal interest
rates about the term structure of ical interest rates. This finding is an extremely useful one
because it suggests that for most countries researchers can examine observable data on the
nominal term structure to provide them with information about the behavior of the tealterm
structure.
Frederic S. Mishkin




In recent years, central banks of many countries have increasingly focused on the goal of
price stability. In pursuing this goal, central banks need information on the degree of inflationary
pressures in the economy, and one natural place to look for this information is the term structure
of interest rates. Research beginning with Fama (1975) often finds that the level of interest rates
helpsforecast future inflation,' while recent research has focused on the information in the term
structure aboutfuture interest rate movements.'These twolines of research suggest that the term
structu'e of interest rates might contain information about the future path of inflation.
One reason why the information in the term structure about future inflation requires
careful study is that it bears directly on whether central banks should use the term structure as
a guide for monetary policy, as has recently been advocated by the Vice-Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Re..rve. A second reason is that empirical evidence on this topic
can tell us whether movements in the term structure of ical interest rates (which is not directly
observable) are revealed by movements in the term structure of nominal interest rates (which is
observable). The term structure of real interest rates has an important role in understanding
asset pricing and in theories of the business cycle and so is of much concern to theorists. Finding
out whether observable data on the nominal term structure provides information about the
behavior of the a1 term structure can thus help guide theoretical research.
This paper examines empirically what the term structure of interest rates tells us about
future inflation in the United States and in nine other OECD countries using euro market data.
'For example, Nelson and Schwert (1977), Mishkin (1981, 1984), Fama and Gibbons (1982),
and Huizinga and Mishkin (1986).
2Forexample, Shiller, Campbell andSchoenholtz (1982) and Mankiwand Summers(1984) have
questioned the value of the term structure in predicting future short-term interest rates, while
recent evidence in Fama (1984), Fama and Bliss (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1987), Hardouvelis
(1988) and Mishkin (1988a) is more positive about the ability of the term structure to forecast
future interest rates.2
Earlier research, Mishkin (1988b), has examined the information in the term structure about
future inflation in the U.S. using Treasury bill rate data. However, there are several reasons why
a multi-country empirical analysis of the information in the term structure about future inflation
is needed. Assessing future inflationary pressures in the economy is a concern of central banks
in all the countries studied here. Thus learning about the ability of the term structure to forecast
the future path of inflation in each of these countries is important knowledge for their central
bankers to have because it will help them decide whether using the term structure as a guide for
monetary policy is a sensible strategy. It is also worth examining what the term structure tells us
about future inflation in other countries besides the U.S. because it will provide us with clues
about bow the information in the term structure might change with different monetary regimes.
Different countries do provide different conclusions on the relationship between inflation and
interest rates,' and so it is plausible that the information in the term structure might differ
substantially across countries. A final reason for examining data in other countries is that it will
provide further information on which results found for the United States are robust across
countries. This is also important because the information in the term structure in the U.S. may
be representative of only one type of monetary regime and a change in the regime may alter the
information in the term structure. Finding that certain results tend to be true for other countries,
should make U.S. policymakers more secure about conclusions derived from U.S. data.
II. The Methodology
The main focus of the paper is on estimates of a forecasting equation that tell us whether
the term structure helps to predict the future path of inflation. This equation, which will be
referred to as the 'inflation change equation, is a regression of the change in the future-period
inflation rate from the a-period inflation rate (i' -onthe "slope' of the term structure (i'-
'For example, see Mishkin (1984).3
i).
(1) ,r7-r7 =0.,.+fl_ji7-ifl+?77
Tests of the statistical significance of the fl.coefficientand whether it differs from 1.0
reveal howmuch information there is in the slope of the term structure about future changes in
inflation. More specifically, as isdescribed in Mishkin(1988bJ, astatistical rejection of ft, =0
provides evidence that 1) the term structure contains significant information about the future
path of inflation, and 2) the slopes of the term structures of real and nominal interest rates do not
move one-for-one with each other. On the other hand, a statistical rejection of ft.. =1provides
evidence that 1) the slope of the real term structure is not constant over time, and 2) the term
structure of nominal interest rates provides information about the termstructure of real interest
rates.
Note that the phrase 'information in the term structure is being used in this paper quite
narrowly. Information in the term structure about the path of future inflation refers only to the
ability of the slope. 17 .17to predict the change in the inflation rate, ir7 -w.This paper focuses
on the predictive power of the slope term, i7 -17.because it is the most natural piece of
information in the term structure to examine. Tests of the statistical significance of the ft,..
coefficient and whether it differs from one reveal how much information there is in the slope of
the term structure about future changes in inflation.
Before going on to a discussion of the data nod the empirical results, several additional
econometric issues that have important consequencesfor hypothesis testing need to be discussed.
One important econometric consideration is that the error term i7 exhibits serial correlation
which renders OLS standard errors invalid. One source of the serial correlation arises from the
use here of overlapping data in which> 1--i.e., the number of periodsfor the interest rate and
the inflation rate are greater than the observation interval. As is well known, this leads to4
correlation of the error term with up to rn-I of its lagged values. Furthermore, as is explained in
Mishkin (1988b).additionalserial correlation in ,canstem from serial correlation of real
interest rates. Examination of the residual autocorrelations revealed that ,7' often has
significant correlation with its values lagged more than rn-I periods, especially for countries
other than the United States. Valid standard errors are generated using the method outlined by
Hansen and Hodrick (1980),witha modification due to Hansen (1982) that allows for conditional
beteroscedasticity' and a modification by Newey and West (1987) that insures the variance-
covariance matrix is positive definite by imposing linearly declining weights on autocovariance
matrices. The standard errors reported in the tables are constructed allowing f or non-zero
autocorrelations going back three years (36 periods) which is enough to capture the serial
correlation revealed in the data.' -
Additionalinformation is available in the term structure that is not being used in ordinary
least squares estimation because contemporaneous errors in forecasting inflation for different
horizons may be highly correlated. Therefore, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates
of a system of equations with different horizons may produce substantial gains in efficiency.' The
'The Hansen (1982) modification is the same numerically as that proposed by White (1980).
White's results are obtained with unconditional heteroscedasticity rather than conditional
heteroscedasticity, but additional assumptions are required.
'I also estimated the standard errors for each equation allowing only for non-zero autocor-
relations going back rn-i periods and the results were not appreciably affected.
'There are two ways to think about the inflation change forecasting equation and hence about
the consistency of SUR estimated coefficients, If the forecasting equation is just viewed as a
projection equation in which the error term is by construction orthogonal to the 17 -iregressor.
then consistency of the SUR estimates requires an additional assumption that the C -iin each
equation is uncorrelatedwith all the error terms. As described in Mishkin (i988b), an alternative
way of viewing the inflation change equation is as a test for $,= 1.With this interpretation,
the same conditions that produce consistency for OLS estimates of fi.,. =1--theconstancy of
the real rate differentials, rr7 -rr--alsoproduce consistency of the SUR estimates. Constancy
of the real rate differentials implies that the error terms just equal the difference between the
forecast errors of inflation at theand g horizon. Since under rational expectations these
forecast errors are uncorrelated with all information available at time t, which includes 17forall
m, constancy of the real rate differentials implies the condition for consistency of the SUR
estimates, that all of the explanatory variables in the equations are orthogonal to all the error
terms.5
SUR standard errorestimateswillagain be incorrect because of the serial correlation of the error
terms. The Hansen-Hodrick, Newey-West estimate of the variance-covariance matrix allowing
for conditional heteroscedasticity can be generalized to a pply to a seemingly unrelated regression
system of g equations as follows. The SIJR estimation method assumes that the variance.
covariance matrix of the residuals is D2'IT where,
E =variance-covariancematrix of the contemporaneous residuals from the g
equations,
=TxTidentity matrix, where T is the number of observations.
Using the Choleski decomposition S' =P'P,we get the GLS (i.e., the SUR) estimates by
premultiplying the system by POIT and then proceed with OLS estimation. AUowing for
conditionaiheteroscedasticity, theHansen-Hodrick variance-covariance matrixof the parameter
estimates of the transformed system is then,
(2) V= (X'X)tX''XJ(X'Xyt
where,
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Writing thevariance-covariance matrix out results in
(3) V =
Making use ofthe fact that PP=Z1, thevariance-covariance matrix forthe SUR estimates,
whichis corrected for serial correlationboth withinandacross equations and allows for
conditionalheteroscedasticity, canbe rewritten as,
(4) V =
withthe j,k (where jand k reference equations) block of the EfX'(E'@1,)'(E4e1,)X}matrix




q = the order of theMAprocess for the error terms in the system.
'Notethat thepresence of 7717' in the formula for the variance-covariance matrix in (4) takes
accountof serial correlation of theerror termsboth within an equation andacrossequationsas
well asfor conditionalheteroscedasticityin thesecovariances.Thuseven though StiR estimation
onlytakes account of contemporaneouscorrelation of error termsacross equations. thevariance-
covariancematrixaboveis corrected for serialcorrelation both within and across equations as
wellas for conditional heteroscedasticity.7
Now that we have completed our discussion of the econometric details, wecan go on to
discussthe dataused in the empirical analysis.
III. The Data
The empirical analysis makes use of monthly data on inflation rates andone, three, six, and
twelve-month interest rates in the euro deposit market for the following ten OECD countries:
United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,Netherlands,
Switzerland and Japan. For every country except Japan, the sample period extends from the
beginning of the floating rate period, April 1973, to December 1986.' However, the data for
Japan is unavailable until October 1975, so the sample period for Japan starts in October 1975.
The inflation datafor these countries are seasonally unadjusted CPI measures obtained from the
International Financial StatistAs (IFS) tape maintained by the International Monetary Fund with
the exception of the U.S. data. Because of the well known problems with the treatment ofhousing
costs in the U.S. CPI before 1983, the U.S. inflation data is calculated from a CPI series which
appropriately treats housing costs on a rental-equivalence basis throughout the sample period.
For more details on this series see Huizinga and Mishkin (1984, 1986). The euromarket data
have been obtained from the Harris Bank tape maintained at the NYU Business School andare
used in this study for several reasons.' High quality data for domestic interest rates are notas
readily available for other countries besides the United States and Canada. In some of the other
countries, domestic Treasury bill rates are not always market clearing, so that these data,
although sometimes nvailable, do not reflect the true cost of credit. Euro rates, however, are
'Note that with a sample period ending in December 1986, inflation data for theyear 1987 is
required.
'In the few cases where euro rate data were missing, the euro rate was calculated from the
interest parity condition. The rest of the data were checked by verifying that there were no large
deviations from interest parity. Several obvious errors in the tape were found in this manner and
were corrected.8
market clearing. In addition, euro deposits denominated in different currencies are issued by
banks that have similar default risks,'0 and they are not subject to capital controls because they
are offshore securities. This makes the term structures of different countries comparable because
they will not have to be adjusted for differing default risks or non-comparability because of
capital controls. Both the interest rates and inflation data are expressed on a continuously
compounded basis at an annual rate in percent.
The timing of the variables is as follows. A January interest rate observation uses the euro
rate data for the last Friday of December. A January observation for a one-month inflation rate
is calculated from the December and January CPl data; a three-month inflation rate from the
December and March CPl data; and so on.
IV. The Empirical Results
Table! contains the estimates of the inflation-changeforecasting equations which regress
the change in the future rn-period inflation rate from the i-period inflation rate (ir7 -ir)on the
slope of the term structure (i -i). In contrast to previous research which has found that the
level of interest rates contains a great deal of information about the level of future inflation, there
is less evidence in Table 1 that the slope of the term structure provides information about the
future path of inflation. Thefl_.coefficieutsare statistically significant only one-third of the time
and are not always positive (almost one-quarter of them are negative).
The United States displays negative as well as positive fl,, coefficients for horizons less
than twelve months and onlyfor m =12are thefl_,, coefficients statistically significant. The US.
results thus suggest that the shortest end of the term structure (maturities of six months or less)
trhe euro deposit rates are collected from quotes by the Harris Bank in the case of euro
dollars and by other banks that specialize in issuing euro deposits in other currencies. The fact
that interest parity holds fairly tightly in the data here indicates that the risk premiums are very
simtlar for the different banks quoting the euro deposit rates.Table 1
Estimatesof InflationChangeEquationc
-— a. + fl.4i-iJ+






3,1 0.0121-0.3166 0.005 2.145 -1.30 54Ø**
(0.0552) (0.2437)
6,1 -0.0522 0.0995 0.001 2.620 0.565.05
(0.1324) (0.1785)
12,1 -0.0679 0.3339 0.022 2.735 2.49* 497**
(0.2247) (0.1340)
6,3 -0.0422 0.2547 0.006 1.359 0.78 2.49*
(0.0801) (0.3260
12,3 -0.0075 0.4514 0.059 1.726 2.16*2.62**
(0.1814) (0.2094)
12,6 0.0441 0.4316 0.057 1.054 2.69** 35**
(0.1300) (0.1603)
Country: CANADA
3,1 -0.0655 0.2881 0.001 3.114 0.87 2.16*
(0.0688) (0.3293)
6.1 -0.1067 0.0035 0.000 3.319 0.02 5.63**
(0.1267) (0.1168)
12,1 -0.1920 -0.0096 0.000 3.655 -0.06 6.79**
(0.2291) (0.1487)
** 6,3 -0.0569 -0.2710 0.006 1.473 -1.13 5.31
(0.0783) (0.2395)
12,3 -0.1850 -0.1547 0.004 1.940 -0.63 4.71**
(0.2036) (0.2454)
12,6 -0.1236 -0.1347 0.003 1.199 -0.57 4.81**
(0.1544) (0.2361)Country: UNITED KINGDOM
3,1 -0.0834 0.5229 0.002 6.491 0.82 0.75
(0.1342) (0.6339)
6,1 -0.0035 0.1434 0.010 7.763 1.43 0.49
(0.3245) (0.5213)
12,1 0.2039 1.0072 0.031 8.224 3.16** -0.02
(0.6214) (0.3186)
6,3 0.0817 0.7328 0.009 3.857 1.25 0.46
(0.2493) (0.5853)
12,3 0.2881 0.9934 0.039 5.141 3•94**0.03
(0.4890) (0.2520)
12,6 0.1655 0.9798 0.042 3.053 2.89 0.06
(0.2537) (0.3388)
Country:BELGIUM
3,1 -0.0571 0.5829 0.006 3.041 0.60 0.43
(0.1250) (0.9746)
6,1 -0.0349 -0.0131 0.000 3.392 -0.02 1.88
(0.1720) (0.5380)
12,1 -0.1298 0.0353 0.000 3.793 0.10 2.80**
(0.3411) (0.3447)
6,3 -0.0340 -0.0846 0.001 1.653 -0.48
(0.1116) (0.1160)
12,3 -0.1143 0.0466 0.000 2.213 0.20 4•Ø9**
(0.3201) (0.2329)
12,6 -0.1068 -0.0096 0.000 1.287 -0.03 3.48**
(0.2059) (0.2898)Country: FRANCE
3,1 -0.0816 0.3863 0.054 2.183 4.22**6.71**
(0.0886) (0.0915)
6,1 -0.1150 0.3256 0.062 2.660 5.23** 10.82**
(0.1518). (0.0623)
12,1 -0.1377 0.2700 0.063 2.873 3.76** 1O.17**
(0.2630) (0.0718)
6,3 -0.0462 0.2319 0.029 1.316 3.31** [Q95**
(0.0803) (0.0701)
12.3 -0.0913 0.2394 0.052 1.828 1.80 573**
(0.2306) (0.1328)
12,6 -0.0237 0.2910 0.057 1.117 1.56 3.80**
(0.L777) (0.1865)
Country: GERMANY
3,1 -0.0649 0.5959 0.009 2.460 1.85 1.26
(0.0648) (0.3219)
6,1 -0.1062 0.3523 0.006 3.024 1.68 3.09**
(0,1242) (0.2094)
12,1 -0.2122 0.3420 0.012 3.137 3.11**599**
(0.2024) (0.1098)
6,3 -0.0390 0.0414 0.000 1.596 0.15 3•45**
(0.0693) (0.2775)
* ** 12.3 -0.1627 0.3071 0.011 2.093 2.02 4.55
(0.1616) (0.1523)
12,6 -0.1116 0.5418 0.030 1.308 2.35* 198*
(0.1132) (0.2310)Country: ITALY
3,1. -0.0589 -0.2659 0.007 4.443 2.03* 9.67**
(0.1120) (0.1309)
6,1 -0.11.83 -0.0621 0.001 5.514 -0.56 9.56**
(0.2323) (0.1111)
**
12,1 0.0131 0.1880 0.009 6.01.3 1.81 7.84
(0.4920) (0.1036)
6,3 -0.0009 0.1876 0.006 2.945 1.99* 8.61**
(0.1363) (0.0944)
12,3 0.4276 0.5346 0.075 3.883 3.10**2.70**
(0.5092) (0.1724)
12.6 0.5129 0.763S 0.118 2.267 2.51* 0.78
(0.4594) (0.3043)
Country: NETHERLANDS
3,1 -0.1752 0.0875 0.000 4.0/8 0.15 1.55
(0.1050) (0.5900)
*
6,1 -0.2086 -0.0179 0.000 4.619 -0.04 1.99
(0.1596) (0.5103)
**
12,1 -0.3293 0.0275 0.000 4.739 0.08 2.78
(0.2203) (0.3495)
6,3 -0.0416 0.0025 0.000 2.561 0.01 3•37**
(0.0877) (0.2959)
12,3 -0.1588 0.1692 0.004 2.760 1.29 6.34**
(0.1956) (0.1311)
12,6 -0.1109 0.1455 0.007 0.922 1.18 6.93**
(0.1212) (0.1234)Country: SWITZERLAND
3,1 -0.0276 0.1184 0.000 3.813 0.32 2.39*
(0.1.395) (0.3690)
6,1 0.2670 -0.5338 0.006 4.728 -1.48 4.27**
(0.2101) (0.3596)
12,1 -0.0742 -0.2668 0,003 4.836 -0.97 4.60**
(0.3235) (0.2754)
6,3 0.1647 -0.7804 0.016 2.412 2.30* 525**
(0.1193) (0.3389)
12,3 -0.1631 -0.2588 0.005 2.957 -0.95 4.62**
(0.2657) (0.2723)
12,6 -0.1936 0.0767 0.000 1.722 0.27 3.22**
(0.1846) (0.2863)
Country: JAPAt
3,1 -0.7235 2,9616 0.056 6.923 2.30*-1.52
(0.4345) (1.2863)
6,1 -0.6336 1.7293 0.044 7.212 3.16** -1.33
(0.4717) (0.5475)
12.1 -0.5186 1.0314 0.028 7.647 3.36** -0.10
(0.4032) (0.3014)
6,3 -0.0451 0.2564 0.001 3.204 0.65 1.90
(0.0941) (0.3915)
12,3 -0.1938 0.1594 0.002 3.628 0.53 2.79**
(0.1886) (0.3008)
12,6 -0.1569 0.1523 0.002 1.702 0.51 2.82**
(0.1366) (0.3006)
=differencebetween the rn-periodinflationratefromLime jtoLjmand the2-period
inflation rate fromi tot±. i' -= differencebetween the rn-period nominal interest rate and then-
period nominal interest rate at Lime j.Standarderrors of coefficients in parentheses. SE =standard
error of the regression.
*
= significantat the 5% level. =significantat the 1% level,
bFhe sample period for Japan starts in October 1975, the first date that data is available.9
provides no information aboutfuture inflation, while around maturities of twelve months, there
is some information in the term structure about future changes in inflation. These results are
consistent with those found with U.S. Treasury bill data in Mishkin (19S1b). although Treasury
bill data indicates stronger forecasting ability for Lhe spread between twelve-month and six-
month rates than do euro rate data.
Thesomewhatstronger ability of Treasury bill rates to forecast future changes in inflation
suggests that the euro rate results in TableI mayeven understate somewhat the information in
the term structure of domestic interest rates for the future path of inflation." As is pointed out
in Mishkin (1984). euro rates bear a substantial risk premium over Treasury bill rates because,
in contrast to Treasury securities, which are riskiess in nominal terms, euro deposits are subject
to default risk since their issuing bank might (au. indeed, this default risk premium is very
variable and has at times exceeded five percentage points. Fluctuations in this risk premium in
the euro rates are likely to obscure some of the ability of the term structure of euro rates to
forecast the future path of inflation, and this is exactly what we find for U.S. data.
The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Japan also display information about
the future path of inflation in the term structure, with the evidence for significant forecasting
ability of the term structure strongest f or France and the United Kingdom. For France and the
United Kingdom, all the$., coefficients are positive, and at least half are statistically significant
at the 1% level.
Examination of the results on (1 - $_j in Table 1 indicate that the nominal term structure
contains substantial information about the term structure of real interest rates in most countries
is quite strong. With the exception of the United Kingdom and Japan, the (1. fl_J estimates are
always positive, are statistically significant 90% of the time and are significant at the 1% level
80% of the time. For Japan, the evidence is somewhat mixed with two of the (1 -$..,I estimates
"This might be less true if there are significant capital and exchange controls in the economy
which result in greater time-variability of the risk premiums in domestic interest rates.10
positive and statistically significant, while three of the estimates are negative but statistically
insignificant. The term structure for the United Kingdom, on the other hand, reveals absolutely
no information about the term structure of real interest rates. All the (1 -$,J estimatesare
statistically insignificant with t-statistics less than one in absolute value.
As was discussed in the methodology section, if equation residuals across different time
horizons are correlated, more efficient estimates can be obtained by exploiting this information
with seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation. Table 2. which contains the SUR
estimates of the same inflation change equationsfound in Table 1, indicates that SUR estimation
often leads to large increases in efficiency -.coefficientstandard errors often decline by more
than 50% and in one case declines by 80%
The increased efficiency of the SUR estimates tends to strengthen the conclusions reached
before. All the fl..coefficientsfor France and the United Kingdom are now statistically
significant, whilefive out of six are significant I or Germany. Thus the SUIt results provide even
stronger evidence that the term structure in these countries contains substantial information
about the future path of inflation.
The SUIt estimates of the (1 -$_.]coefficients continue to provide strong evidence that
the nominal term structure contains substantial information about the term structure of real
interest rates for most countries. With the exception of the United Kingdom and Japan, almost
all of the (1 .fl.jestimates are significantly positive at the 1% level. For Japan, all of the (1
fi_j estimates are positive and half are statistically signiicant at the 5% level. The evidence for
these nine countries is thus quite strong that the term structure of nominal rates reveal a great
deal of information about the term structure of real rates. The results for the United Kingdom
continue to tell a different story. Despite much greater precision in the coefficient estimates
1tNote, however, that in several cases, the estimated standard errors are higher in Table 2 than
they are in Table 1. Even though the SUR estimates are asymptotically more efficient than OLS
estimates, in small samples estimated SUIt standard errors can turn out to be larger than OLS
standard errors.Table 2
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUit) Estimates
of InflationChangeEquation?
-E—a.,.+fl.,,[i -ifl+,r






3,1 -0.0366 0.2940 0.75 1.81
(0.0786) (0.3900)
** 6,1 -0.0841 0.3099 1.55 3.45
(0.1366) (0.2000)
* ** 12.1 -0.0695 0.3173 2.38 5.12
(0.2307) (0.1335)
6.3 -0.0467 0.3160 1.84 399**
(0.0741) (0.1714)
* ** 12,3 -0.0304 0.3208 2.25 4.75
(0.1887) (0.1429)
12,6 0.0173 0,3239 2.32* 4.84**
(0.1279) (0.1397).
Country: CANADA
** 3,1 -0.0471 -0.1560 -0.56 4.15
(0.0628) (0.2788)
6,1 -0.1023 -0.1570 -0.82 6.03**
(0.1251) (0.1919)
12,1 -0.2327 -0.1570 -0.84 6.22**
(0.2522) (0.1860)
6,3 -0.0553 -0.1583 -0.78 5.67*
(0.0780) (0.2042)
12,3 -0.1859 -0.1576 -0.88 6.49**
(0.2086) (0.1783)
12,6 -0.1305 -0.1572 -0.86 6.36**
(0.1447) (0.1819)Country: UNITED KINGDOM
3,1 -0.0882 0.8549 3.71** 0.63
(0.1365) (0.2301)
6,1. 0.0112 0.8600 4.72** 0.77
(0.2911.) (0.1821)
12,1 0.1412 0.8659 4.14** 0.64
(0.5685) (0.2092)
6,3 0.0995 0.8600 457** 0.76
(0.1936) (0.1842)
12,3 0.2296 0.8659 4.17** 0.65
(0.4887) (0.2076)
12,6 0.1.299 0.8681 4.17** 0.63
(0.3070) (0.2081)
Country: BELGIUM
3,1 -0.0095 0.0107 0.03 2.36*
(0.0676) (0.4190)
** 6.1 -0.0349 -0.0169 -0.08 4.54
(0.1742) (0.2240)
12,1 -0.1431 -0.0151 -0.07 4.38**
(0.3543) (0.2317)
** 6,3 -0.0279 -0.0189 -0.09 4.62
(0.1110) (0.2207)
** 12,3 -0.1359 -0.0153 -0.06 4.29
(0.2998) (0.2364)
** 12,6 -0.1082 -0.0149 -0.07 4.59
(0.1926) (0.2213)Country: FRANCE
3,1 -0.0646 0.2967 2.12* 503**
(0.0766) (0.1399)
61 -0.1097 0.2951 2.45* 5.86**
(0.1443) (0.1203)
12,1 -0.1319 0.2941 2.91**
(0.2686) (0.1010)
** **
6,3 -0.0434 0.2931 3.10 7.48
(0.0804) (0.0945)
** **
12,3 -0.0683 0.2929 3.25 7.84
(0.2185) (0.0902)
** **




3,1 -0.0513 0.4072 2.62 3.81
(0.0588) (0.1555)
** **
6,1 -0.1132 0.4035 3.86 5.70
(0.1147) (0.1046)
** **
12,1 -0.22L9 0.4039 3.45 5.09
(0.2005) (0.1171)
** 6,3 -0.0619 0.3992 1.92 2.89
(0.0660) (0.2081)
** **
12,3 -0.1707 0.4020 3.39 5.05
(0.1611) (0.1185)
** **
12.6 -0.1087 0.4046 2.60 3.83
(0.1.141) (0.1555)Country: ITALY
3.1 -0.0089 0.2923 0.87 2.11*
(0.1180) (0.3346)
6,1 0.0301 0.3113 1.21 2.67**
(0.2761) (0,2579)
12,1 0.2007 0.3402 1.95 3.78**
(0.5723) (0.1743)
6.3 0.0431 0.3305 1.88 3$Q**
(0.1720) (0.1760)
12,3 0.2329 0.3643 2.31* 4.03**
(0.4927) (0.1576)
12,6 0.2099 0.4009 1.89 2.82**
(0.3520) (0.2126)
Country: NETHERLANDS
3,1 -0.1775 0.1212 1.81 13,11**
(0.1031) (0.0670)
6,1 -0.2241 0.1191 1.29 957**
(0.1294) (0.0920)
12,1 -0.336L 0.1194 1,59 11.73**
(0.2043) (0.0751)
6.3 -0.0466 0.1169 1.45 10.97**
(0.0833) (0.0805)
12.3 -0.1587 0.1195 1.49 10.98**
(0.1954) (0.0802)
12.6 -0.1119 0.1206 1.72
(0.1187) (0.0701)Country: SWITZERLAND
3,1 0.0372 -0.0996 -0.41 449**
(0.1119) (0.2448)
6,1 0.0402 -0.1261 -0,43 3.81**
(0.2374) (0.2953)
12,1 -0.1601 -0.1131 -0.49 4.86**
(0.3233) (0.2291)
**
6,3 0.0009 -0.1481 -0.38 2.91
(0.1391) (0.3944)
12,3 -0.1999 -0.1183 -0.52 4.90**
(0.2609) (0.2284)
12,6 -0.1932 -0.0944 -0.38 439**
(0.1846) (0.2493)
Country: JAPANb
3,1 -0.2111 0.4424 0.30 0.37
(0.3231) (1.4872)
6,1 -0.2565 0.3916 0.48 0.74
(0.3618) (0.8232)
12,1 -0.3888 0.3704 0.84 1.43
(0.3652) (0.4413)
**
6,3 -0.0518 0.3409 1.55 2.99
(0.0921) (0.2203)
12,3 -0.1926 0.3379 1.39 2.72'
(0.1881) (0.2431)
12,6 -0.1412 0.3360 1.39 2.74**
(0.1320) (0.2421)
r7-= differencebetween the rn-period inflation rate from time jtoj±jnand the A-period
inflation rate from I to tin- 17- i'=differencebetween the rn-period nominal interest rate and the n-
period nominal interest rate at time t. Standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. SE standard
error of the regression.
*
= significantat the 5% level. =significantat the 1% level.
bThe sample period for Japan starts in October 1975, thefirst date that data is available.11
- the standard errors of half the coefficients decline by over 50% as a result of using SUR estima-
tion -- noneofthe fi - fi_.j coefficients is statistically significant; indeed, none even has a t-
statistic exceeding one. The evidence is thus even stronger that the U.K. differs from other
countries in an important respect: its term structure of nominal interest rates containsno
information about its term structure of real interest rates.
A.Interpretation
Underthe assumption of rational expectations, the interpretation of the inflation-change,
forecasting equation flu. is quite straightforward. Following Fama (1984) and Hardouvelis





a = of EØr'7 - iC)I/o(rr . rr = the ratio of the standard deviation of the
expected inflation change to the standard deviation of the slope of the real
term structure,
p = the correlation between the expected inflation change, E,('r . ir), and the
slope of the real term structure, rr? -
This expression is derived by writing down the standard formula for the projection equation
coefficient fl_p, and recognizing that the covariance of the inflation forecast error with nT rr
equals zero given rational expectations.
"Note that a and p are constructed from unconditional variances and covnrinnces.12
The equation above indicates thatfl_ is determined by bow variable the expected inflation
change is relative to the variability of the slope of the real term structure {represented by a , the
ratio of the standard deviations of E,fr7 - 'C) and (rr7 - rr)J. as well as by the correlation of the
expcctedinflation.change with.the real term structure slope (p). Differences in the correlation
and relative variation of expected inflation and the real term structure slope in the Len countries,
possibly the result of different monetary regimes, will thus produce different /3,,, and hence
different conclusions about the information in ihe term structure about the future path of
inflation. Figure 1 shows how /3,,. varies with a and p.
In order to understand why the /3,,,. differ across countries, we calculate estimated values
of; and p using the procedure outlined in Mishkin (1981), in which estimates of the real term
structure spreads, rr - rr, are obtained from fitted values of regressions of the ex-post real rate
differentials on past inflation changes and past interest rate spreads." Then the estimated
expected inflation change is calculated from the following definitional relationship,
(6) E,(x - 'C) = 17 - i7 - (rr-rr7)
Finally estimates of; and p are calculated from the estimated E,(W7 - 'C) and (rr7 - rC).
With the exception of France, the estimated values of p for the other countries in Table I
were quite negative, averaging around -0.8 and typically ranging from -l).5 to -0.95 These values
of p follow from the fact that with the exception of France, the variability of the slope of the
nominal term structure, 17 - i, is very small relative to the variability of the slope of the real term
structure, rr - rC, and thus, as is evident in equation (6) above, the correlation between E,(r7 -
'C) and r17 - rr must necessarily be quite negative. As can be seen in Figure 1, with estimates of
"The estimates described in the text were generated from OLS regressions in which the ex-
post real rate differential, eprr7 - eprr, was regressed on 17 - i, this differential lagged twelve
months, fifteen months and twenty-four months, and on the inflation change (w - 'r') lagged
twelve months and twenty-four months. I also experimented with other choices of lags and the
















p around -0.8, ifthevariability ofexpectedinflation changes is sufficientlyless than the
variability of the real term structure slope so that ais less than 0.8, then $, will not be above
zero.
Low estimated values of a which are less than 0.8 are exactly what we find for all the
horizons in countries such as Canada, Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland. These low values
of a and very negative values of p thus explain why we do Dotfind significantpositive m,
coefficientsfor these countries.
Research that suggests that term premiums undergo substantial fluctuations over time'
provide a rationale for the low values of a and the resulting inability of the term structure to
provide information about the future path of inflation. Variation in the slope of the real term
structure can be attributed to the variation of teim premiums over time as well as changes in the
average of expected one-period real interest rates over the next rn-periods versus the next a-
periods.High variation in these term premiums will then produce high variation in the slope of
the real term structure and make it more likely that the variation of the real term structure slope
will dominate the variation of expectedfuture inflation changes. The outcome of substantial time
variation of term premiums will then be a low a and a lowfl estimate, so that the term structure
will provide little information aboutfuture inflation changes. The flip side of this argument is
that substantial variation in term premiums, which produceslow _,estimates,lead to the finding
that the term structure of nominal interest rates contains a great deal of information about the
term structure of real interest rates.'
"Jones and Roley (1983), Mankiw and Summers (1984), Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz
(1983), and Startz (1982).
"The same reasoning in this paragraph provides a more rigorous explanation of why results
using eurorates indicate that there is less information in the term structure about the path of
future inflation than when T-bill data is used as in Miskkin (1988b). As explained in the text,
eurodollar rates embody a default risk premium not found in T-bill rates. The additional risk
premium in euro rates can thus lead to greater variation in the real term structure slope which
leads to smaller a and hence lowerfl,, estimates.14
Inthe case of Germany, the variability of expected future inflation changes is closeto the
variability of the real term structure slopes and this explains why the estimated _,coefficients
are positive and close to 0.5. In the case of the United States and Italy, for the short horizons in
which mis lessthantwelve months, a is quite low; but as the rn-horizon lengthens the variability
of the real term structure slope declines relative to the variability of theexpected inflation
changes so that a rises above 0.9. The result is that the fi_, coefficients get larger at Longer
maturities, and this is why results for both Italy and the U.S. suggest that there is significant
information in the longer maturity term structure about future inflation changes.
In Tables and 2 the results for the United Kingdom stand out because it has the highest
values ofand is the only country for which we cannot reject the null hypothesis that fl., =1.
These findings are readily explained by the fact that the U.K. consistently has the highest
variability of expectedfnture inflation changes relative to the variability of the real term structure
slopes. The estimated a 's which range from LU to 1.1 interact with p's which are around -0.9 to
produce ,,coefficientsclose to 1.0.
Theestimated values of p for France are quite different than for the other countries. In
contrast to all the other countries studied here, France has greater variation in the slope of the
nominal term structure than in the slope of the real term structure. The result is estimates of p
that are generally around zero. Thus, even though the variability of expected future inflation
changes for France are less than the variability of real term structure slopes, so that a 's are less
than 0.85, Figure 1 shows us that the fl., will be positive but less than 0.5, which is exactly what
we find in Tables 1 and 2. The fact that France displays large variation in the nominal term
structure slope (the explanatory variable) explains the statistical significance for the French fl,,.
estimates because in the regressions itleads tohigh variability of theexplanatory variable relative
to the variability of the dependent variable."
"This fact also explains why the French regressions have the highest R"s because R1 equals 9
times the ratio of the variance of the explanatory variable to the variance of the dependent
variable.15
V.Conclusions
Thispaper provides evidence on what the term structure (for maturities of twelve months
or less) tells us about future inflation in ten OECD countries. The empirical results on the
information in the term structure contrast with those in previous research which find that the
level of interest rates helpforecast the future level of inflation. instead they indicate that for the
majority of the countries in the sample, the term structure does not contain a great deal of
information about the future path of inflation. The resultsfor France, the United Kingdom and
Germany tell a different story, however. In these countries the term structure contains a highly
significant amount of information about future changes in inflation.
The analysis in this paper suggests that central banksfor most of the countries studied here
should exercise some caution in using the term structure of interest rates as a guide for assessing
inflationary pressures in the economy, as is currently under consideration by the U.S. central
bank. There are two reasonsfor this conclusion. First, the empirical evidence here indicates that
although there is significant information in the term structure about the future path of inflation
for a few of the countries, this is not a result that is true in general.
Second, as the interpretation of the results indicates, the fl-regression coefficients are
sensitive to the relative variability of expected future inflation changes and real term structure
slopes, as well as to the correlation of these two variables. Any change in the method of
conducting monetary policy, such asfocusing on the term structure as a guide to monetary policy,
is likely to change the correlation and relative variability of expectedfuture inflation changes and
real term structure slopes, thus causing the regression coefficients to change in the inflation-
change forecasting equation. Thus the forecasting ability of the term structure for the path of
future inflation could change dramatically, making the term structure a poor guide for monetary
policy. This is, of course, just another example of the Lucas (1976) critique.16
The empirical evidence does reveal, however, that for every country studiedexcept the
United Kingdom, there is a great deal of information in the term structure of nominal interest
rates about the term structure of ml interest rates. This finding is an extremely useful one
because it suggests that for most countries researchers can examine observable dataon the
nominal term structure to provide them with information about the behavior of the term
structure.17
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